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Abstract
This paper considers the influence of spatial competition on education
and its effect on students’ school choice and educational achievement by
explicitely modeling educational production and the students’ participation
decision. Education at school is a function of teacher effort and class size.
Students decide which school to attend on the basis of an assessment of
the associated costs and prospective benefits from doing so. We analyze
how competition between schools affects equilibrium resource spending and
school diversity as well as the level and distribution of student attainment
and welfare. The consideration of spatial aspects of school choice without
recourse to vertical differentiation is a unique contribution of this paper.
We argue that schools in metropolitan areas with short ways to school
and many potential students face fiercer competition which increases school
productivity and student performance. This result confirms the findings in
Hoxby (2000). Overall learning time in school is constant in the probabil-
ity that students behave well if students are segregated by type. However,
better behaved students have a higher achievement due to higher optimum
resource spending.
Finally, we support our argument by an empirical analysis of student per-
formance in various matura schools in Switzerland.
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1 Introduction
Competition between schools is one of the most hotly debated approaches to
providing incentives in order to improve education. The first step towards a
competitive environment for schools is the introduction of school choice. In such
a system, public schools have to compete at least against other public schools. A
second step is the introduction of vouchers to enable students to attend any school
– public or private – they (or their parents) like. The best-known proponent of
this idea is Friedman (1997). Distinguishing between the financing and the pro-
vision of education, it is possible to assess whether private schools perform bet-
ter than public schools. Vouchers create a market in education by establishing
an exchange mechanism and the price is the nominal value of the voucher. As
an entitlement to an amount of schooling, such vouchers may allow students to
choose their education, where – because of government funding – the inequali-
ties which potentially arise with choice are ameliorated. Potential consequences
of voucher programs include changes in who enters the teaching profession, how
teachers and students allocate time and effort to various tasks, and how students
sort themselves into schools, classrooms, and neighborhoods (cf. Neal, 2002).
Evidence concerning the market for education suggests that there are beneficial
effects from vouchers and school choice, but up to now, research can not give
clear answers to the basic questions whether and how competition leads to better
school performance. In this paper, we focus on the implications of school district
properties and schooling policy measures for student attainment and achieve-
ment.
Most of the empirical literature on school competition and student performance
considers the U.S. education sector where competition takes place between pri-
vate and public schools. As will be discussed in section 2 below, empirical evi-
dence suggests that competition between schools indeed leads to better student
performance in public schools. The question addressed in the application of
the model is whether students in the Swiss education system, where the role
of private schools is minuscule and therefore competition concentrates on public
schools, also profit from free school choice via the introduction of a voucher-like
system. The analysis of horizontally differentiated schools with homogeneous
school quality in equilibrium distinguishes our approach from the existing lit-
erature on school competition. It is most appropriate in school systems where
public schools dominate and student selection on the basis of other criteria than
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performance is prohibited. In the empirical application of the model we concen-
trate on the upper secondary level of education since this is the one on which
students are most mobile and the establishment of free school choice and compe-
tition is explicitly intended to provide schools incentives to improve. Geograph-
ical restrictions for attending certain schools being very diverse throughout the
country, an important focus of the paper is on the impact of the geographical
dimension on school competition and student attainment.
We first present an overview of the literature on school competition. Then, we
provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the effects of school district
properties and policy measures on student attainment and achievement. Finally,
we discuss the actual competitive environment for matura schools in Switzer-
land and assess parts of our theoretical findings with data from the Program for
International Student Assessment (PISA) in the context of the Swiss school sys-
tem.
2 Related Literature
A large body of theoretical research examines the effects of competition on school
quality and sorting across schools, cf. eg. Epple and Romano (1998, 2002), Hoyt
and Lee (1998), Nechyba (1996, 1999, 2000), Caucutt (2002), and McMillan (2004).
In this research, schools are often treated as passive technologies converting re-
sources into educational achievement, thus abstracting from institutional char-
acteristics of the school system and potential incentive effects of vouchers that
influence school efficiency. Empirical findings on the effectiveness of competi-
tion between schools are controversial. Among the proponents of school choice
are West (1997), Hoxby (2000, 2003), Holmes, DeSimone, and Rupp (2003); rather
critical is Carnoy (1997). The potential problem of decreased equity in competi-
tive school systems, where private schools tend to privilege certain student types,
is addressed in Ambler (1994) and Ladd (2002).
Overall, evidence concerning the market for education suggests that there are
beneficial effects from competition, but up to now, research cannot give clear
answers to the basic questions whether vouchers and school choice will lead to
market-like competition and whether this will lead to better school performance
(cf. Levin, 2002). Potential disadvantages of voucher schemes include significant
financial resources and teachers’ time diverted to marketing and more weight
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given to quantifiable examination results than to what is important. Thus, the
costs of a voucher system may outweigh the expected benefits of introducing
competitive pressure to schools and greater freedom into the provision of educa-
tion.
3 The Model
3.1 Model Outline
We develop a theoretical model which focuses on the effect of vouchers with
respect to a school’s choice of spending on schooling resources and class size
and students’ participation decision if education is compulsory. The main differ-
ence to the literature lies in the use of a more elaborate educational production
function and the explicit modeling of students’ participation decision. Also, the
spatial dimension of school competition is explicitly taken into account. How-
ever, we abstract from peer-group effects such that higher school quality due to
increased competition is a natural result. The model discussed in the following
is similar to the approach taken by De Fraja and Landeras (2004). They model
the interaction between schools and students in a framework where a student’s
educational attainment depends on her effort, her peer group and the quality of
teaching. They find that teacher incentives as well as competition may have per-
verse effects on outcome. This is due to strategic interaction between students
and teachers.
Our model considers a competitive educational sector in the sense that students
are free to choose the school they (or their parents) like. Students receive an
education voucher in the form of free entry to any school they like, which equal-
izes them with respect to their endowment; schools are not allowed to accept
payment other than the publicly provided voucher. The necessity of the physi-
cal attendance by students and teachers qualifies education as a local good. We
therefore assume competition between schools to be spatial in the sense of Salop
(1979). The exact location of students and schools is discussed in section 3.3 be-
low. The Salop-model, on which our approach is based, has not yet been applied
to competition among schools in the literature. In our model, the inefficiency
of schools occurs not within schools due to the extraction of rents: Even with
low competitive pressure, all schools make zero profit due to free entry into the
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market. The inefficiency arises from excess entry into the market. Hence, in the
analysis below, tougher competition will lead to larger schools and thereby to a
more productive educational system.1
We assume that there are N students per school district. Educational production
consists of providing students with educational achievement of size H. Student
success as a result of educational production is a very abstract concept deserving
detailed appraisal of its own. In the context of this paper, we simply assume
that schooling success is measurable as for example in external tests. Then, the
passing of these tests may be either a prerequisite to move on to higher education
or enable students to find highly qualified jobs. We are, however, well aware that
such tests are limited to only a few dimensions of educational outcomes. Hence,
a comprehensive analysis would have to include an in-depth discussion of the
very goals of education in schools (productivity, literacy, citizenship), and the
multi-dimensionality of inputs in educational production (cf. e.g. Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1991 and Holmstrom, 1982). For the sake of simplicity and focus
on the goal of this paper, we abstract from these issues.
Figure 1
Timeline of
decisions in the
model.
1
2
3
4
Schools enter market;
Schools choose educational resources e and class size m;
Students choose school;
Students work with productivity P;
We assume free entry of schools which compete in resources and class size –
given the students’ participation constraint. The sequence of decisions is de-
picted in figure 1. To solve backwards for the equilibrium, we must (4) define
an education production (student success) function, (3) determine the students’
participation constraint, (2) determine the Nash equilibrium in educational re-
sources and class size for any number of schools and calculate the reduced-form
profit function and (1) determine the Nash equilibrium in the entry game of
schools.
1This result is driven by the effect of business stealing among schools. Teacher teamwork is easier
encouraged in small schools, such that our result will not necessarily hold in a more general setting.
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3.2 Educational Production Technology
In analyzing total educational production H, we discern between school produc-
tion and home production of education:2
Hi,j = Pj + Qi,
where subscripts i and j refer to individual students and schools, respectively.
Educational production at school, Pj, is a (positive linear) function of educational
inputs per class and class size in the sense of Lazear (2001): When one student
disrupts classwork, the entire class suffers; the teacher’s and the other students’
concentration is diverted from studying. Let pi be the probability that a student
is not misbehaving at any moment in time. We assume that students are homo-
geneous with respect to pi. Then, the probability that all students in a class of
size m are behaving is pim which is also equal to the proportion of schooling time
during which students are effectively studying. Thus, a student’s education P in
school j is given by the following educational production function:
Pj = ejpi
mj , pi ∈ [0, 1[ , (1)
where e denotes educational inputs per class,m is class size, and pi is the individ-
ual probability of non-disruption. For simplicity, we assume a cost function for
resources η (e) of the form
η (e) = εe. (2)
The term resources is not confined to physical resources at schools, such as the size
of the classroom, whether there are computers, etc., but contains also teachers’
education and motivation.3 The home production part of education is
Qi = q (ξi) ,
where ξ is a vector of student characteristics, such as her family background and
her motivation. The home production part of eduction is student-specific and
exogenous to schools. It will be needed in the emiprical application of the model
in section 4.
2Cf. Wo¨ssmann (2004) for a discussion of the school production vs. the home production part of
education.
3Figlio (1999) finds that higher student-teacher ratios are associated with lower student performance
and that higher teacher salaries are positively related to increased student performance. Cf. Pritchett
and Filmer (1998) for a theory on the role of the relative strength of parents vs. teachers in the allocation
of education expenditures.
6
3.3 Spatial Aspects of Student School Choice
Competition between schools is operationalized through free school choice by
students and free teacher/school entry in the educational sector. Students incur
transport costs by travelling to the school they attend. The term transport costs
can be understood literally or as an expression for preferences toward a specific
school type. Given this latter interpretation, the government can control trans-
port costs by allowing free school choice or force parents to move to another
district if they want their children to attend the school specific to that district.
Generally, in metropolitan areas, there are several schools, each relatively close to
where students live and with a large variety of elective courses, such that trans-
port costs are low compared to rural areas, where the next school may be far
away.
The following characterization of competition between schools is similar to the
spatial competition model in a circular city by Salop (1979). Students are located
on a circle with a perimeter equal to 1. Density is unitary around this circle such
that the total mass of students is 1. Schools are also located around the circle, and
all travel occurs along the perimeter.4 Schools do not choose their location, but
are exogenously located equidistant from one another on the circle as in figure 2.
Thus, maximum differentiation is exogenously imposed.5
Figure 2
Uniform location of students and schools
around a circle.
j + 1
j
j − 1
In principle, any school j competes against any other school on the circle. How-
ever, since schools are symmetric, we can abstract from the competition against
4Apart from its spatial interpretation, the schools’ location can also be taken as differentiated school
profiles with respect to their curricula.
5The uniform location around the circle is optimal if also students are located uniformely around the
circle and if transport costs are increasing and convex. With linear costs, there are multiple equilibria,
one of which is the uniform allocation assumed here (cf. Economides, 1989, and Tirole, 1988).
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schools which are not immediate neighbors. Students expect utility V which
is separable over the private value of the school part of their education and the
transport cost to school: V = P− δx, where x is the distance to the chosen school.
In compulsory education, the local student participation constraint can be ex-
pressed by the student’s indifference between attending school j and attending
any other school. Thus, the local participation constraint writes as
PC:j Pj − δx˜ = P− δ
(
1
J
− x˜
)
, (3)
where J denotes the total number of schools in the district and x˜ is the farthest
distance to a student attending school j. The number of students s attending
school j, sj, results from the area around the circle from which students are at-
tracted: This area stretches in both directions up to a distance x. Solving (3) for
x gives half the mass of students attracted. Denoting by N the total number of
potential students in a district, sj is computed as
sj = 2x˜N = N
Pj − P +
δ
J
δ
. (4)
In symmetric equilibrium, school enrollment is simply sj = s = N/J, such that
travel costs δ have no influence on s. From the perspective of an individual
school, however, higher transport costs make it more difficult to attract more
students (business stealing from oter schools). On the other hand, with high
transport costs, a school will lose fewer students to its neighbors if it offers lower
quality. We thus have computed the number of students in school j given the
number of schools, success probability in school j and in its neighboring schools.
The next step backwards is the computation of the success probability in each
school as a function of class size and resource spending.
3.4 Class Size and Resource Optimization
Schools receive a per-student contribution (voucher value) of g from the govern-
ment and incur fixed costs f which include infrastructure costs et cetera. Any
school j maximizes its profit Wj over resources and class size subject to the po-
tential students’ local participation constraint. The maximization problemwrites
as
Π
∗
j : W
∗
j = max
ej,mj∈R+
{
gsj −
1
mj
η
(
ej
)
sj − f
}
,
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where sj is given by (4), g is the student voucher value and η(e) is effort cost, as
in (2). The first-order condition defining the optimum level of resource spending
is
ej : g
dsj
dej
!
=
1
mj
η′
(
ej
)
sj +
1
mj
η
(
ej
) dsj
dej
. (5)
The marginal benefit of increasing resources on the left hand side of (5) is just the
per-student transfer g multiplied by the marginal reaction of enrollment sj. The
total marginal cost on the right hand side of (5) consists of the direct marginal
cost plus the cost per additional student times the marginal enrollment reaction.
The first-order condition with respect to class size mj is
mj : g
dsj
dmj
!
= −
1
m2j
η
(
ej
)
sj +
1
mj
η
(
ej
) dsj
dmj
. (6)
Again, the marginal (negative) benefit of increasing class size is the per-student
transfer times the change in enrollment. The marginal cost consists of the reduc-
tion of direct cost and the adjustment of student participation.
The two first-order conditions (5) and (6) can be merged to yield result 1.
Result 1 With student achievement defined by (1), the resource cost function given by
η (e) = εe, and respecting the local student participation constraint (4), the optimum
values of m and e are
m∗ = −
1
lnpi
, (7)
e∗ = max
{
0,
m∗g
ε
−
δ
Jpim
∗
}
. (8)
Proof. The proof is given in appendix 6.1.
Since e is restricted to be nonnegative, we have to distinguish between internal
and corner solutions.6
If the number of schools is exogenously fixed (i.e. in the short-run) and education
is compulsory, educational achievement can be improved by an increase in the
voucher value:
dP∗
dg
= −
1
ε lnpi
pi−
1
lnpi > 0.
6Of course, the corner solution e = 0 results in a shutdown of the school system.
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This incentivizes schools to increase resource spending, while optimum class size
remains unchanged. Higher transport costs decrease performance through a di-
minishing competitive pressure on schools,
dP∗
dδ
= −
1
J
< 0.
while the number of students in a district does not affect achievement. Neither
does the value of the fixed costs f which just determines the schools’ rents in the
absence of free entry. The optimum value of resource spending e is a positive
function of J, the equilibrium number of schools per district,hence
dP∗
dJ
=
1
J2
> 0.
The equilibrium number of schools will be determined in the next step back-
wards.
3.5 School Entry
The number of schools is endogenous in our model.7 It is given by the zero-profit
condition for the existing schools in the market:(
g−
1
m∗
η (e∗)
)
sj − f
!
= 0. (9)
Combining (8) and (9), we see that a school’s gross profit
(
g− εe
∗
m∗
)
sj is decreas-
ing in the total number of schools. Hence, additional schools will enter the mar-
ket as long as gross profit exceeds fixed costs f . The equilibrium number of
schools per district is given in result 2.
Result 2 The equilibrium number of schools is
J∗ =
√
Nδε
m∗pim
∗
f
. (10)
7In the present model setting, the entry of an additional school results in a rearrangement of incum-
bent schools. Hence, the model is ill-suited to analyze actual entry of additional schools. However,
comparative static effects are sensibly interpretable even in this simple model.
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Proof. The proof is given in appendix 6.2.
The number of schools in a district increases with the number of students N and
decreases with fixed cost f . Also, the higher transport costs are, the more schools
exist in equilibrium. This is due to the effect that higher transport costs decrease
the competitive pressure on schools which allows more schools to operate with
non-negative profit.
Note that the equilibrium number of schools does not depend on the voucher
value. This is due to the mutual cancellation of the direct positive effect on the
school profit function and the indirect effect via optimum resource spending in
(9). An increase in the voucher value just inflates the level of spending in all
schools, but does not actually alter their competition. Hence, the structure of the
school system is not altered by changes in student-based school funding. The
equilibrium number of schools can now be used in the computation of optimum
resources and class size in order to determine the equilibrium student success
probability.
3.6 Equilibrium
Assuming positive resource spending and merging the partial results yields an
equilibrium student success probability P∗ = e∗pim
∗
with m∗ = − 1lnpi and e
∗ =
m∗g
ε −
√
m∗ f δ
/
εNpim
∗
. Variables which are potentially influenceable by policy
interventions are voucher value g, fixed costs which have to be borne by schools
f and transport cost δ. A concrete measure to influence f would be the lump-sum
subsidization of schools, while δ can be influenced by changing the bureaucratic
cost of choosing a certain school or the installation of a school bus system. Com-
parative statics yield
dP∗
dg
= −
1
ε lnpi
pi−
1
lnpi > 0,
dP∗
d f
= −
1
2
√
−
δ
f N
1
ε lnpi
pi−
1
lnpi < 0,
dP∗
dδ
= −
1
2
√
−
f
δN
1
ε lnpi
pi−
1
ln pi < 0. (11)
Thus, a student’s educational achievement increases in government spending per
student, while it decreases in fixed school costs and transport costs. An increase
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in per-student government spending incentivizes schools to compete harder for
additional students, hence increasing their educational production. An increase
in fixed costs decreases the number of schools, thereby reducing competitive
pressure and inducing schools to lower their resource spending. The effect of
higher transport costs on educational achievement works via two channels: On
the one hand, higher transport costs c.p. decrease resource spending by reduced
competition. On the other hand, higher transportation costs increase the equilib-
rium number of schools which intensifies competition, cf. (8) and (10).
Another interesting comparative static result is the impact of the district size N
on student success:
dP∗
dN
=
1
2
√
−
δ f
N3
1
ε lnpi
pi−
1
lnpi > 0. (12)
Students have c.p. a higher achievement in areas with more students than in
areas with fewer students. This is also due to a higher number of schools in a
more densely populated district which induces fiercer competition.
The comparative static results can be interpreted along the line of argument of
Hoxby (2000). She argues that Tiebout choice8 among school districts serves as
a powerful market force in American public education. Consequently, her em-
pirical investigations suggest that metropolitan areas with greater Tiebout choice
have more productive public schools and less private schooling. In our model
setting, the character of a district – whether it is metropolitan or rural – is deter-
mined by the two parameters N and δ for the population size and transport cost,
respectively. Metropolitan areas have a large number of students while transport
costs in their spatial interpretation are smaller than in rural areas. Considering
equations (11) and (12) we can see that Hoxby’s argument is confirmed by our
analysis. The reason for higher achievement in metropolitan areas in our model
is the same as in hers: A densely populated areawith many schools shows fiercer
competition than an areawhere students have no school choice due to too far dis-
tances. If students have good alternatives, they make high demands to schools.
3.7 The Role of Student Characteristics
Result 3 presents the impact of student characteristic pi on class size, total study-
ing time in class, optimum resource spending and student success.
8By the expression Tiebout choice we refer to households choosing the school district that meets best
their educational needs.
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Result 3 If students are segregated by type,
(a) optimum class size is increasing in the probability pi that students behave well;
(b) total studying time in class, pim is constant in pi;
(c) optimum resource spending increases in pi;
(d) student achievement increases in pi;
(e) the equilibrium number of schools decreases in pi.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix 6.3.
Result 3b can be explained intuitively: Schools raise class size until the optimal
noise level in the class room is reached. This is the same for every class because
in any case, potential productivity is multiplied by the factor that determines the
noise level pim. The cost and benefit of changing class size m do not depend on
how productivity is generated (i.e. on the level of physical resource spending).
Results 3c and 3d are driven by result 3b: An increase in pi increases class size
with no adverse effect on overall learning time which is constant. More students
profiting from extended resources improves schools’ incentives to spendmore on
them. The decrease in the number of schools as a result ofmore attentive students
is due to larger classes. Since schools cannot charge the remaining classes with
an increased fraction of fixed costs, the number of schools must decline.
Next, we discuss the optimum level of government spending from a welfare
point of view.
3.8 Welfare Considerations
In this section, we examine the equilibrium allocation from a normative point
of view. There are three endogenous variables defining an equilibrium: spent
resources e∗, class sizem∗, and total number of schools J∗ . Since m∗ is not depen-
dent on the two other endogenous variables, we can analyze it independently.
Given m∗, we can evaluate the welfare properties of e∗ and J∗ .
Result 4 If education takes place,
(a) in the decentralized equilibrium, class size m∗ is chosen too large by schools;
(b) equilibrium resource spending e∗ is too low;
(c) in the decentralized allocation, the total number of schools, J, is too low or too high,
depending on the values of pi: J∗ T J∗∗ ⇔ mpim S 4ε, where J∗∗ denotes a benevolent
social planner’s choice of J.
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Proof. The proof is given in appendix 6.4.
In the decentralized equilibrium, schools equal marginal costs and benefits of an
increase in resource spending and find interior solutions even though the cost
function and educational production are linear in resources. This is due to the
regressive students’ enrollment reaction. In the centralized optimization prob-
lem, the total benefit of an increase in resource spending is linear, such that there
is no finite interior solution. Hence, in the decentralized equilibrium, too lit-
tle educational resources are spent. The non-existence of an interior solution to
the centralized problem results in too large classes since in the centralized solu-
tion, beneficial extra spending per student is diverted to smaller classes. Regard-
ing the optimality of the number of schools, under reasonable parameter values,
there are too many schools in the decentralized equilibrium. This is due to the
business stealing effect outweighing the profit creation effect: Additional schools en-
tering the market steal other schools’ market share while adding to the spending
of total fixed costs. This is not fully compensated for by the reduction of total
transport costs due to being closer to the students’ home.
Since educational production and resource costs are both linear in resource spend-
ing e, there is no internal solution to the social planner’s choice of e and hence no
policy measure which would assure an optimum class size and resource spend-
ing: Depending on the parameter constellation, there is a systematic under- or
overprovision of education. However, the optimum number of schools is ob-
tained iff schools perceive fixed costs f˜ = (1 + τ) f = 4ε f
/(
m∗pim
∗)
. This can
be induced by taxing/subsidizing the schools’ spending on fixed costs at a rate
τ = 4ε
/(
m∗pim
∗)
− 1.
An increase in the voucher value g results in a linear increase of student achieve-
ment. Total net welfare is the total of private values of education minus transport
costs minus the cost of government spending:
Ω = NP∗ − Nδ

2J∗
1
2J∗∫
0
xdx

− Ng (1+ λ)
= NP∗ −
Nδ
4J∗
− Ng (1+ λ) ,
where λ denotes the net marginal cost of raising government funds.
Result 5 Increased government spending per student increases welfare as long as the
total cost of government spending 1+ λ < − 1
ε lnpi pi
− 1lnpi .
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Proof. The proof is given in appendix 6.5.
Assuming increasing costs of government resources, e.g. through an excess bur-
den in taxation, result 5 implies an optimum level of government spending g
such that the marginal cost of government resources just equals the social benefit
of government spending through higher student achievement.
4 Empirical Assessment
We now turn to a discussion of the secondary education system in Switzerland
and test some of the implications of our model empirically. In Switzerland stu-
dents are tracked by ability after 6th grade. After compulsory schooling, i.e. after
9th grade, adolescents transfer to the upper secondary level which is divided into
general education and vocational education. The general education schools are
the matura schools and the intermediate diploma schools. Apprenticeships as
well as full-time vocational schools are a part of vocational education. In the
following, we concentrate our study on matura schools in three Swiss cantons
since these meet the assumptions on educational production closest: (1) students
are homogeneous with respect to their behavior in class, (2) students have free
school choice and (3) there are financial incentives to schools to attract students.
4.1 The Swiss School System
4.1.1 Vocational Training
Vocational education with training in an enterprise and vocational school was
developed in the 19th century. After the secondary I level, about three-fifths of
the adolescents in Switzerland complete vocational training (apprenticeship). An
apprenticeship takes between two and four years, but the majority takes three or
four years. The practical training takes place in an enterprise (3.5 to 4 days per
week), the theoretical training in a vocational school (1 to 1.5 days). The divi-
sion between enterprise training and vocational schools on the one hand and matura
schools on the other hand constitutes the dual system of education in Switzerland.
In many professions, special training blocks in the form of introductory courses
(triple system) are added. During the introductory courses basic skills of the re-
spective profession are imparted at the training centers of the professional associ-
ations. Furthermore, there are full-time vocational training centers and full-time
15
vocational schools (e.g., commercial middle schools, nursing schools), especially
in western and southern Switzerland.
4.1.2 Matura Schools
The highest school type after elementary school is academic high school (matura
school), which prepares students for entrance into any of the Swiss universities.
It lasts six years, three of which belong to compulsory education. In 1995, a sys-
tem of elective subjects with basic subjects, a main subject and a complementary
subject has been accepted. An education authority assigns each school a main
focus (ancient languages, modern languages, art, science, economics and law).
Schools are allowed to further differentiate by offering complementary subjects.
As to school choice, students are free to choose any school within their respective
canton – provided they pass the centralized entry test. High schools are free for
students; they are financed by the canton on a per-student basis.
There are matura schools in all of the cantons. The education lasts at least 12
years of school from the first primary class to matura. The actual matura school
education really begins after the compulsory education period (short form of the
matura school, duration three to four years), in some cantons, however, even
earlier (long form of the matura school, duration six to seven years).
In the early 1980s 10% of young people attended matura schools every year; to-
day it is 18% on average (between 9% and 32%, depending on the canton). 14’000
teachers teach at 195 matura schools; the number of students is more than 65’000.
Every canton determines admission criteria independently. In more than half of
the cantons, transfer to a matura school occurs without admission examination,
when there are excellent achievements at the lower secondary level (measured
by grades and evaluations by lower secondary level teachers). In other cantons,
a written and oral admission examination is conducted in addition. There are
tests in at least a first national language (German, French, Italian, and Romanic,
depending on the region), a second national language, and mathematics. The
first semester at the matura school is considered a probationary period.
4.1.3 Competition between Matura Schools in the Cantons of Zu¨rich, Bern,
and Aargau
The model presented in this paper reproduces parts of the school system intro-
duced in Switzerland by the regulation of the recognition of matura diplomas
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Maturita¨tsanerkennungsreglement (MAR) in 1995. We study matura schools in the
three Swiss cantons Zu¨rich, Bern, and Aargau because these are the cantons in
which there is at least one city with more than one matura school with no im-
portant geographical differentiation and some solitary schools in smaller cities.
Thus, there is actual school choice in metropolitan areas, whereas in smaller com-
munities, students typically choose the local matura school. Based on our model,
we conjecture that schools in a competitive environment offer higher school qual-
ity, such that students who attend such schools perform c.p. better than students
attending monopoly schools.
4.2 Data and Estimation Technique
We use student performance and school related data from the OECD-PISA survey
in 2000 and individual student data from the accompanying Swiss national study
(SIDOS, 2004). Our empirical analysis is restricted to the students’ reading test
score for which the largest sample size is available and which is usually a good
measure for know-how abilities learned at school (cf. Fertig, 2003). In order
to satisfy the assumptions of our model, we only use data from the cantons of
Zu¨rich, Bern, and Aargau. All observations with missing values are deleted; the
remaining sample consists of 492 observations in 27 different schools (clusters).
Appendix 6.6 gives a detailed description of the variables used in our estimation.
Total reading performance is estimated in the following way
Si,j = Pj + αDj + β
′ξi + ϕi + υj, (13)
where Si,j is the test score of student i attending school j, ξ i is a vector of student
characteristics, ϕi is a student-specific error term and υj is a school-specific error
term. We simplify the theoretical model insofar, as we assume only two different
types of schools, j ∈ {c, r} where c denotes a cityschool in a metropolitan area
and r is a rural school. We hence create a dummy variable Dj for all schools in
towns which have fewer than 15’000 residents and estimate (13) with schools in
metropolitan areas as the baseline category:
Dj =
{
0 if school j is metropolitan,
1 if school j is rural.
Hence, α captures the difference in educational production at school, Pj, between
metropolitan and rural schools. In our sample of schools, this is equivalent to
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grouping schools into ones which are monopolists in their city and ones which
face competition from at least one other school. The coefficient α and the coeffi-
cient vector β are to be estimated. In determining the effect of the school type on
performance, we are especially interested in the value of α, which measures the
difference in the performance measure for otherwise equal students attending a
cityschool vs. a rural school. We control for individual and family background
characteristics of the students.
The dependent variable is a difficulty-adjusted test score in reading. Table 1 re-
ports the summary statistics of the score in our sample. We use OLSwith standard
errors of the coefficients corrected for heteroscedasticity and common factors to
students in the same school by clustering (cf. for a justification of this correction
Froot, 1989, and Moulton, 1986).
Table 1
Summary statistics of reading performance.
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 492 578.6 65.8 379.6 884.5
Landschool 289 565.3 64.6 379.6 884.5
Cityschool 203 597.5 63.0 387.0 812.9
Obseravble input factors in educational production, such as class size and teacher
qualification do not differ significantly between schools in rural and metropoli-
tan areas. Hence, observed differences in student achievement must be due to
differences in teacher motivation and school organization, which possibly result
from diverse competitive settings.
4.3 Empirical Results
Table 2 displays the OLS regression results of estimating equation (13). Since
we study matura schools across cantons, controlling for cantonal characteris-
tics seems appropriate. It turns out, however, that including cantonal dummies
yields no significant canton-specific factors in educational production. We hence
exclude cantonal dummies from our estimation equation.
As the model predicts, Landschool has a significantly negative coefficient imply-
ing that students attending matura school in rural areas perform c.p. worse by 29
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Table 2
Reading performance equation estimation.
Variable Coefficient t-value
Constant 525.00 32.53 ∗∗
Landschool -29.24 -5.00 ∗∗
Personal characteristics
High age -29.63 -2.19 ∗∗
Low age 6.00 0.50
On schedule 4.96 0.83
Female 10.97 2.26 ∗∗
Native 11.22 1.08
Foreign test language -10.53 -1.35
Family characteristics
Parent income 0.13 0.56
Siblings 0.67 0.19
Books at home 7.18 3.39 ∗∗
No PC at home -37.76 -1.82 ∗
Intact family 1.53 0.23
Foreign parents -0.15 -0.02
Secondo 15.63 2.36 ∗∗
Parents medium 0.86 0.09
Parents high 8.92 0.87
Mother tertiary -3.08 -0.25
Father tertiary 3.56 0.40
Discipline -2.37 -0.39
Notes: OLS regression, standard errors are corrected for clustering;
number of observations: 492; number of clusters: 27; R2: 0.16;
∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level;
∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
points than students in schools which face direct competition. Personal charac-
teristics significantly influencing test scores are a student’s high age and gender.
High age means that a student had repeated a class due to unsatisfactory grades
before the test was taken. It seems plausible that reading skills are somewhat
autoregressive, such that this result is not surprising. We also find that female
students perform better, which is a common finding across OECD countries due
to their higher maturity at that age.9
9PISA shows a pattern of gender differences that is fairly consistent across countries: In every coun-
try, on average, females reach higher levels of performance in reading literacy than males. The better
performance of females in reading is not only universal but also large. On average, it is 32 points, and
generally greater than the typical difference in mean scores between countries (cf. OECD, 2001).
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Concerning family characteristics, the number of books at home, whether a stu-
dent has access to a PC at home, and whether one of her parents is born abroad
determines her performance significantly. The number of books can be inter-
preted as an indicator of the parents’ attitude towards reading which influences
their children’s reading capability. Whether a student has a PC at home also indi-
cates her socioeconomic backgroundwhich seems to be favorable if a student has
the opportunity to use a computer. Interestingly, a student performs especially
well if one of her parents was born abroad. One could argue that it is difficult for
such children to attend matura school at all (because of a foreign first language,
a different cultural background, etc.), so that they are particularly motivated to
meet with success once they have this chance.
Besides the analysis of educational achievement (via test scores) as a function of
regional characteristics, also educational attainment (via enrollment rates) could
be analyzed in a similar setting. If school attendance is non-mandatory, students
will choose to attend a certain school type only when their net-benefit from at-
tending such a school is positive. As already laid out, attendance in matura
school is voluntary, such that based on our model, one may expect that student
participation in matura schools is higher in metropolitan areas than in rural ar-
eas.
Figure 3 shows the location of matura schools in the canton of Zu¨rich as black
dots. The ratio of students in matura schools and students in vocational school
is indicated by the shading of the communities: The darker a community, the
larger the fraction of matura students. The figure indeed suggests that children in
communities farther away frommatura schools tend not to attend matura school.
Figure 3
Education in the canton of Zu¨rich.
Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich
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In the city of Zu¨rich, there are many schools close to each other, hence competing
fiercely against each other and keeping their quality high, while schools in the
rest of the canton face almost no competitionwith according performance of their
students. Since more students participate in better schools, the metropolitan area
around the city of Zu¨rich tends to show higher student attainment. Of course, in
a more serious analysis of student attainment, one would also have to control for
student characteristics, which would at least partly explain the high participation
rates on the north-east bank of the lake (indicated by the white stripe in the south
of the map).
5 Conclusion
We have modelled school organization and -finance in a framework where entry
into the educational sector is free and where schools are heterogenous from a stu-
dent’s perspective. The students’ success depends both on class size and spend-
ing on schooling resources. Abstracting from incentive issues within schools, we
have analyzed the effect of competition between schools on student attainment.
Higher government spending and fiercer competition – measured by the num-
ber of schools in a district and lower transport cost – lead to an increase in the
students’ educational achievement. This result confirms the findings in Hoxby
(2000). Overall learning time in school is constant in the probability that students
behave well if students are segregated by type. However, better behaving stu-
dents profit more from schooling due to higher optimum resource spending for
their classes.
We support our theoretical findings by an empirical assessment of student read-
ing performance in matura schools in Switzerland. It turns out that among in-
dividual factors and a student’s socioeconomic background, the location of the
school she attends is an important determinant of her achievement. This backs
our conclusion that indeed competition between schools in the form of free school
choice increases school quality and student performance and that the geograph-
ical characteristics of a school district are important determinants of educational
success.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof to Result 1
Use the local student participation constraint (4) to see that
dsj
dmj
=
Nejpi
m lnpi
δ
,
dsj
dej
=
Npim
δ
.
We thus have
dsj
dmj
= ej lnpi
dsj
dej
.
Insert this into the first-order conditions (6) and (5) to find
m∗j = m
∗ = −
1
lnpi
,
where the first equality results from the symmetry of the schools. Note that by
symmetry sj =
N
J , and solve (5) for e to get
e∗j = e
∗ = max
{
0,
m∗g
ε
−
δ
Jpim
∗
}
where again the first equation results from the symmetry of the schools. Obvi-
ously, the condition for an interior solution for e∗ is
m∗g
ε >
δ
Jpim∗
.
6.2 Proof to Result 2
Insert m∗ and e∗ from (7) and (8) respectively into (9) and solve for J. Assuming
an interior solution for e, we obtain (10).
6.3 Proof to Result 3
(a) Differentiate m∗ with respect to pi to find dm
∗
dpi =
1
pi(lnpi)2
> 0. (b) Studying
time is given by pim. Differentiate with respect to pi to get dpi
m
dpi = 0. (c) Substitute
m∗ into (8), and differentiate with respect to pi to get the result. (d) Substitute m∗
and e∗ into 1 and differentiate with respect to pi. (e) Substitute m∗ into (10), and
differentiate with respect to pi to get the result.
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6.4 Proof to Result 4
(a)/(b) In order to find the optimum values of m and e, given the number of
schools J, a benevolent planner solves the per-student problem
Π
∗∗
m,e : W
∗∗
m,e = max
e,m∈R+
{
epim −
1
m
εe
}
.
The assumption that education takes place amounts to imposing pim > εm . Ex-
ploiting the first-order condition with respect to m yields
m : (m∗∗)2 pim
∗∗
= −
ε
lnpi
⇒ m∗∗ < m∗,
where the inequality results from a comparison with (6). The first-order condi-
tion with respect to e is
e :
dW∗∗m,e
de
> 0.
(c) The efficient number of schools is determined by the social planner’s solution
to the problem
Π
∗∗
J : W
∗∗
J = min
J∈R+

J f + Nδ

2J
1
2J∫
0
xdx



 .
She minimizes the sum of fixed costs plus the total transportation costs. The term
in parenthesis represents the average transportation costs per person, where 12J
is the farthest distance a student has to travel. Therefore, we have
J∗∗ =
1
2
√
Nδ
f
.
Thus, comparing with (10) yields
J∗ T J∗∗ ⇔ mpim S 4ε.
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6.5 Proof to Result 5
The impact of increased government spending on welfare is
dΩ
dg
= N
dP∗
dg
+
Nδ
4 (J∗)2
dJ∗
dg
− N (1+ λ)
= −
N
ε lnpi
pi−
1
lnpi +
m∗pim
∗
f
4
dJ∗
dg︸︷︷︸
=0
− N (1+ λ)
= −
N
ε lnpi
pi−
1
lnpi − N (1+ λ) .
Note that the middle term on the right hand side is zero by (6) and (10).
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6.6 Description of Variables
Table 3
Description of variables.
Variable Description
Read Weighted likelihood estimate in reading; difficulty adjusted
test score
Landschool 1 if school location is in a city with up to 15’000 inhabitants;
in our sample, this also means that there is only one school in
that city.
Parent income Socio-economic index of parents’ occupational status as a
proxy for income
Siblings Number of siblings
High age 1 if student is older than 204 months, 0 otherwise
Low age 1 if student is younger than 180 months, 0 otherwise
Books at home Number of books at home
On schedule 1 if student claims never to have arrived late in school
during the last two school weeks, 0 otherwise
No PC at home 1 if students has never accessed a PC at home, 0 otherwise
Female 1 if student is female, 0 otherwise
Intact family 1 if pupil lives together with father and mother, 0 otherwise
Native 1 if country of birth is Switzerland, 0 otherwise
Foreign Parents 1 if country of birth for both parents is not Switzerland,
0 otherwise
Secondo 1 if only one parent is born abroad, 0 otherwise
Foreign test language 1 if native language is not testlanguage, 0 otherwise
Parents medium 1 if parents’ highest level of education is lower secondary
Parents high 1 if parents’ highest level of education is upper secondary
Mother tertiary 1 if mother has tertiary education, 0 otherwise
Father tertiary 1 if father has tertiary education, 0 otherwise
No Discipline 1 if students feel disturbed by discipline problems at school
Note: Reference categories are metropolitan schools and parental education below secondary level.
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